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Abstract 
We assess different policies for reducing carbon dioxide emissions and promoting the innovation 
and diffusion of renewable energy. We evaluate the relative performance of policies according to 
incentives provided for emissions reduction, efficiency, and other outcomes. We also assess how the 
nature of technological progress through learning and R&D, and the degree of knowledge spillovers, 
affect the desirability of different policies. Due to knowledge spillovers, optimal policy involves a 
portfolio of different instruments targeted at emissions, learning, and R&D. Although the relative cost of 
individual policies in achieving reductions depends on parameter values and the emissions target, in a 
numerical application to the U.S. electricity sector, the ranking is roughly as follows: (1) emissions price, 
(2) emissions performance standard, (3) fossil power tax, (4) renewables share requirement, (5) 
renewables subsidy, and (6) R&D subsidy. Nonetheless, an optimal portfolio of policies achieves 
emissions reductions at significantly lower cost than any single policy. 
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1.  Introduction 
To reduce greenhouse gas emissions and promote technological development and 
diffusion of renewable energy, recent policies and proposals employ a broad range of incentives.  
Some policies create disincentives for emitting energy sources by taxing these energy sources or 
by making greenhouse gas emissions expensive, such as with a tradable emissions permit 
system, a tax on carbon dioxide (CO2), or an emissions intensity standard for generation.  
Alternatively, others try to ensure viable markets for the environmentally desirable technology, 
such as a generation subsidy for renewable energy or a portfolio (market share) requirement for 
renewable sources.  Still other polices focus on reducing the cost of research and development 
(R&D) and of investment, such as a tax credit for R&D or subsidies for capital costs.  Similar 
policy initiatives are growing not only for renewables, but also for relatively clean coal 
technologies, advanced nuclear power, and a range of technologies in the transportation sector. 
Much attention is being given particularly to the potential for renewable energy to 
displace fossil-fueled sources.  In 2001, renewable energy sources provided 5.7% of the total 
primary energy supply for OECD countries, with 54% coming from combustible renewables and 
waste,1 35% by hydropower, and 12% by geothermal, solar, wind, and tide energy (IEA 2002). 
For electricity generation, renewables represented 15% of production worldwide, but only 2.1% 
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1 This category includes biomass and excludes trash and nonrenewable waste. 
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if one excludes hydro.  The United States aims to nearly double energy production from 
renewable sources by 2025 (excluding hydro), compared to 2000 levels.2  Meanwhile, the 
European Union has a target to produce 22.1% of electricity and achieve 12% of gross national 
energy consumption from renewable energy by 2010 (International Energy Agency 2003). Given 
such ambitious targets, a great deal of focus has been placed on the role of technological 
innovation in lowering the cost of these nonemitting energy sources.  
Although economists typically argue that a direct price for CO2 (via a tax or tradable 
permit system) would provide the most efficient incentives for development and use of less 
emitting technologies, the diversity of the present policy portfolio suggests that other forces are 
at play.  First of all, emissions pricing policies that risk significantly reducing economic activity 
among energy intensive sectors have little appeal to most governments.  Second, raising the price 
of CO2 can have important distributional consequences, both for owners of fossil-fueled 
generation sources and for consumers.  Third, failures in the market for innovation, such as 
spillover effects, imply that emissions pricing alone will not provide sufficient incentive to 
improve technologies.  Nor can governments credibly use the promise of high future emissions 
prices to boost current innovation, since such high prices would no longer be needed once the 
resulting cost reductions arrive.3 Finally, the process of technological advance can take place not 
only through R&D investments, but also via learning through the production and use of new 
technologies; thus, encouraging output may also spur innovation.  Consequently, subsidies—and 
output-support strategies in particular—are often attractive to decisionmakers and play an 
important role alongside emissions regulations and R&D policies.  
The environmental economics literature on induced innovation has focused on the role 
and effectiveness of environmental policy in stimulating innovation in environmentally friendly 
                                                 
2 The Department of Energy Strategic Plan, “Protecting National, Energy, and Economic Security with Advanced 
Science and Technology and Ensuring Environmental Cleanup,” Draft: August 6, 2003. 
3 See Kennedy and Laplante (1999) and Montgomery and Smith (forthcoming). 
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technologies (Jaffe et al. 2003).  Empirical investigations have assessed the effects of energy 
price changes and regulations on innovations in energy technologies, finding support for induced 
innovation as well as autonomous progress (Newell et al. 1999; Popp 2002).  Theoretical 
analyses have tended to focus on the efficacy of market-based environmental policies relative to 
prescriptive regulation in inducing efficient innovation (Downing and White 1986; Magat 1978; 
Zerbe 1970).  Furthermore, among different market-based instruments, innovation and adoption 
incentives may also differ (e.g., Milliman and Prince 1989; Biglaiser and Horowitz 1995; Jung et 
al. 1996; Fischer et al. 2003; Requate and Unold 2001). However, these studies have primarily 
focused on comparing Pigouvian emissions pricing policies, like emissions taxes and auctioned 
or grandfathered permits, rather than a more pragmatic, broader set of policies such as those 
using performance standards and supporting renewable energy technologies.   
The treatment of technological change is also important in models for assessing the 
impact of climate change policies (Carraro et al. 2003).  While most modeling efforts assume 
exogenous technical change, the small number of climate-energy models that incorporate 
induced technological change can be roughly divided into two types (Popp 2004).  So-called 
“bottom-up” models tend to pay great attention to energy systems and technologies, but this 
detail comes at the expense of overall economic structure and aggregate economic interactions. 
This limits the ability to compute welfare effects. “Top-down” models, on the other hand, have 
richer aggregate modeling of responses to environmental policies, but at the expense of 
technological detail.  An additional dichotomy is that bottom-up models that include induced 
technological change tend to focus more on progress as a function of learning by doing, while 
top-down models tend to assume progress comes from cumulative R&D investments.  On the 
policy front, top-down models tend to focus on the analysis of policies that change the price of 
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emissions, such as CO2 taxes or tradable permits.4 This focus is due in part to the limited ability 
of top-down models to represent other types of policies, which often requires greater 
technological detail. 
In this paper, we bridge several areas in the analysis of climate policies and induced 
innovation. We consider a broad set of environmental policies, including indirect ones, and 
incorporate “knowledge investment” through both learning by doing and R&D.  We identify six 
of the main policy options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the electricity sector and 
evaluate their relative performance according to different potential goals: emissions reduction, 
renewable energy production, R&D, and economic surplus.  We also assess how the nature of 
technological progress—the degree of knowledge spillovers and the degree of innovation 
occurring through learning by doing or R&D-based innovation—affects the desirability of 
different policy measures.   
Some clear principles emerge.  We find that when the ultimate goal is to reduce 
emissions, policies that create incentives for fossil-fueled generators to reduce emissions 
intensity, and for consumers to conserve energy, perform better than those that rely on incentives 
for renewable energy producers alone. Overall, we find that the nature of knowledge 
accumulation is far less important than the nature of the policy incentives.5 For the type of 
moderate emissions targets we explore, a renewable energy R&D subsidy turns out to be a 
particularly inefficient means of emissions reduction, since it postpones the vast majority of the 
effort to displace fossil-fueled generation until after costs are brought down. A very similar result 
was found by Schneider and Goulder (1997) employing a CGE approach. This requires very 
large R&D investments and forgoing near-term cost-effective opportunities to reduce emissions. 
                                                 
4 For example, Goulder and Mathai (2000) model technological innovation through both R&D investments and 
learning by doing in the context of optimal carbon taxes.  While these two formulations differ somewhat, they find 
that in practice the optimal tax is essentially the same. 
5 This is consistent with the results of Parry et al. (2003), who find that the welfare gains from correcting an 
environmental externality are more important for policy than the gains from technological change. 
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While climate change is a long-term problem, the results for mid-term strategies emphasize the 
important role for policies that encourage abatement across all available forms and timeframes 
and the limitations of narrowly targeted policies, particularly those focused solely on R&D.  
Nonetheless, given the presence of more than one market failure—an emissions 
externality and knowledge spillovers—no single policy can correct both simultaneously; each 
poses different trade-offs (Jaffe et al. 2005). The presence of knowledge spillovers means that 
separate policy instruments are necessary to optimally correct the climate externality and the 
externalities for both learning and R&D.  In fact, we find that an optimal portfolio of policies can 
achieve emissions reductions at significantly lower cost than any single policy (as did Schneider 
and Goulder (1997)), although the reductions continue to be attributed primarily with the 
emissions price.  
Together, these results illuminate some arguments in Montgomery and Smith 
(forthcoming)—that R&D is the key for dealing with climate change and that an emissions price 
high enough to induce the needed innovation cannot be credibly implemented.  We show that an 
emissions price alone, although the least costly of the single policy levers, is significantly more 
expensive alone than when used in combination with optimal knowledge subsidy policies.  
Although a high future emissions price may not be credible, the required emissions price is more 
modest with the combination policy.  However, if one believes that even a modest emissions 
price is not politically feasible, an R&D subsidy by itself is not the next-best policy, and the 
costs of that political constraint are likely to be quite large and increasing with restrictions on the 
remaining policy options. It should be kept in mind, however, that we focus on reductions over 
the near-to-mid term and incremental improvement of existing technology, rather than 
breakthrough technologies that might achieve deep reductions. It seems likely that policies 
focused on R&D have greater salience in the latter context, although this lies beyond the scope 
of the current paper.  
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1.1.  Alternative environmental and technology policies 
Among the OECD countries, policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and support 
renewable energy vary widely, both in form and in degree.6  We distinguish six policies. First, an 
emissions price on CO2 provides incentives to reduce CO2 intensity and makes fossil-fueled 
sources relatively more expensive compared to renewables.  Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and 
Norway have CO2 taxes,7 and in 2005 the European Union launched a program of tradable CO2 
emissions permits.  
Second, a tax on fossil-fueled energy seeks to discourage use of these sources in favor of 
renewables.  The United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands tax fossil-fueled 
sources, in most cases by exempting renewable sources from an energy tax. Third a tradable 
emissions performance standard sets the average emissions intensity of fossil and renewable 
output combined.  Although less frequently discussed for promoting renewable energy in 
electricity generation, it does arise in climate policies for energy-intensive industries, such as for 
certain sectors in the United Kingdom’s Climate Change Levy.   
Fourth, so-called portfolio standards for renewable sources are a popular form of support.  
These market share requirements—also known as quota obligations, green certificates, and the 
like—may require either producers or users to derive a certain percentage of their energy or 
electricity from renewable sources.  Such programs have been planned or established in Italy, 
Denmark, Belgium, Australia, Austria, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; a range of portfolio 
standards for electricity generation are in operation in 18 of the U.S. states and the District of 
Columbia. Fifth, a production subsidy for renewable energy improves the competitiveness of 
these sources vis-à-vis fossil fuels.  The United States has the Renewable Energy Production 
                                                 
6 The IEA maintains the Renewable Energy Policies & Measures Database for IEA Member Countries, available at 
http://library.iea.org/dbtw-wpd/textbase/pamsdb/re_webquery.htm, and the Database of State Incentives for 
Renewable Energy (DSIRE) in the United States is available at http://www.dsireusa.org/. 
7 The tax rates range widely; for example, Sweden’s tax rate, currently about $70/ton CO2, is indexed to inflation, 
while Norway’s has different rates for different source sectors, from $12-47/ton CO2. 
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Incentive of 1.9 cents per kWh, and 24 individual U.S. states have their own subsidies.  Canada 
also has a Market Incentive Program, and several European countries (Germany has been 
particularly supportive), as well as Korea, have production subsidies.  Many countries also 
support renewable energy output by subsidizing costs (like equipment or capacity installation) 
rather than offering a per-kWh subsidy. The United States, for example, has a 10% investment 
tax credit for new geothermal and solar-electric power plants. 
Finally, subsidies for R&D investment in renewable energy are also quite common, 
including government-sponsored research programs, joint initiatives, grants, and tax incentives.  
Major programs exist in the United States, United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, Germany, Japan, 
and the Netherlands. R&D subsidies are used to encourage both near-term improvements, as 
with R&D tax credits and commercialization incentives, and long-term innovations, as with 
targeted research programs. 
Myriad additional financial incentives for renewables also exist, including government 
grants, personal and corporate income tax credits and deductions, and lower or exempted value-
added taxes on biofuels or renewable energy equipment.  Net metering provisions help small 
users benefit from their excess generation of renewable source electricity.  And several state and 
local governments have green power purchasing requirements, as do several OECD countries.  
However, to the extent these policies offer different incentives, they are less likely to be as 
significant as the broad-based mechanisms that are our focus. 
2.  Model 
We develop a unified framework to assess the six different policy options for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions and promoting the development and diffusion of renewable energy in 
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the electricity sector.8  The stylized model is deliberately kept simple to highlight key features. It 
includes two subsectors, one emitting (fossil fuels) and one nonemitting (renewables), and both 
are assumed to be perfectly competitive and supplying an identical product, electricity.9  Fossil-
fueled production includes a CO2-intensive technology (coal) that operates primarily as baseload, 
and a lower-emitting technology (gas turbines) that dominates at the margin. To the extent that 
renewable energy is competitive, it displaces marginal fossil-fueled generation.10  The model has 
two stages, each representing a specific number of years. Electricity generation, consumption, 
and emissions occur in both stages, while investment in knowledge takes place in the first stage 
and, through technological change, lowers the cost of renewables generation in the second.  An 
important assumption is that firms take not only current prices as given, but also take prices in 
the second stage as given, having perfect foresight about those prices.   
To allow for consideration of the length of time it takes for innovation to occur, and for 
the lifetime of the new technologies, let the first and second stages be made up of   and   
years, respectively.  For simplicity, we assume that no discounting occurs within the first stage; 
this assures that behavior within that stage remains identical.  However, let 
1 n 2 n
δ  represent the 
discount factor between stages.  It is possible to allow for discounting within the second, longer 
stage by altering   to reflect such discounting; in that case   can be thought of as “effective” 
years. 
2 n 2 n
                                                 
8 This focus reflects both the great deal of policy attention devoted to this sector, which accounts for two-fifths of 
CO2 emissions, and the availability of data to parameterize the model.  However, the qualitative results will still 
offer intuition for other sectors—or a broad-based program to reduce CO2. 
9 Although large portions of the electricity sector remain regulated, policy-induced changes to marginal production 
costs are likely to be passed along to consumers, and in a longer horizon, a transition to more deregulated markets is 
also likely to make markets relatively competitive in the future. 
10 We treat nuclear- and hydro-based generation as being fixed in response to the policies we model, a reasonable 
assumption based on existing detailed modeling results (see section on numerical application). 
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2.1.  The emitting fossil-fueled sector 
The emitting sector of the generation industry, denoted with superscript F, relies on two 
fossil fuels for production: coal, x, and natural gas, y. Total output from the emitting sector is 
ttt f xy =+ in year t.  Total emissions from this sector equal 
  tx ty Ex t y µ µ = + , (1) 
as each fuel has a fixed CO2 intensity  i µ .  Marginal production costs for natural gas- and coal-
fired generation,   and  , respectively, are assumed to be increasing in output 
( ).  The opportunities for CO2 abatement in electricity generation rely 
largely on fuel switching; although coal gasification technologies or generation efficiency 
improvements are options, they tend to explain little of the predicted reductions in climate policy 
models (see, e.g., EIA 2006).   
() y Cy ′ ( ) x Cx ′
() 0 , () 0 yx Cy Cx ′′ ′′ >>
Two policies affect the fossil-fueled sector directly: an emissions price and an output tax 
(which may be explicit or implicit, as with the portfolio standard discussed below).  Let  t τ  be the 
price of emissions (i.e., emissions tax or equilibrium permit price) and  t φ  be the tax on fossil-
fueled generation at time t, respectively.  Other policies that stipulate quantity standards, such as 
renewables portfolio standards and emissions performance standards, will be specified in the 
next section, as they require some modifications to the generalized model.  In fact, the effects of 
performance standards for renewables and emissions can be represented by these twin taxes. 
Profits for the representative emitting firm are 
  , (2)  ()
()
111 11 1 1 1 1 1
222 22 2 2 2 2 2
() () ( ) ( ) ( )




nP xy C x C y x y
nP xy C x C y x y
πφ τ µ µ
δφ τ µ µ
=− + −−− +
+− + − − −+ )
                                                
where Pt is the price of electricity.  The firm maximizes profits with respect to output from each 
fuel source, yielding the following first-order conditions:11 
 
11 We assume an interior solution; although theoretically possible, no fuel will be completely driven out of the 
market in our scenarios. 
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Together, equations (3) and (4) imply  () () xt t x y t y Cx Cy τ µτ µ ′ ′ + =+ , meaning that coal generation 
is used until its marginal costs are equalized with those of natural gas, inclusive of their 
respective emissions costs.  The combination of these two equations means that, in the absence 
of an emissions price, an increase in renewables supply crowds out natural gas- and coal-fired 
generation in proportion to the slopes of their competing supply curves. A higher emissions price 
leads to a larger reduction in coal-fired production, since that is the only policy to differentiate 
between coal and gas.   
2.2.   The nonemitting renewable energy sector 
Another sector of the industry generates without emissions by using renewable resources 
(wind, for example); it is denoted with superscript R.  Annual output from the renewables sector 
is  .  The costs of production,  , are assumed to be increasing and convex in output, 
and declining and convex its own knowledge stock,  , so that  ,  ,  , and 
, where lettered subscripts denote derivatives with respect to the subscripted variable. 
Furthermore, since marginal costs are declining in knowledge and the cross-partials are 
symmetric,  .  Note that we have simplified considerably by assuming there is 
technological change in the relatively immature renewable energy technologies, but none in the 
relatively mature fossil-fueled technologies. While it is of course not strictly true that fossil-
fueled technologies will experience no further technological advance, incorporation of a positive, 
t q ( , ) tt GK q
t K 0 q G > 0 qq G > 0 K G <
0 KK G >
0 qK Kq GG =<
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but slower relative rate of advance in fossil fuels would complicate the analysis without adding 
substantial additional insights.12 
The knowledge stock   is a function of cumulative knowledge from R&D, Ht, 
and of cumulative experience through learning by doing,  , where   and  , and 
.  Cumulative R&D-based knowledge increases in proportion to annual R&D 
knowledge generated in each stage,  , so 
( , ) tt KHQ
t Q 0 H K ≥ 0 Q K ≥
QH HQ KK =
t h 21 1 HH n h 1 = + .  Cumulative experience increases 
with total output during the first stage, so  21 1 QQn q 1 = + . Research expenditures,  ( ) t R h , are 
increasing and convex in the amount of new R&D knowledge generated in any one year, with 
 for h > 0 ,  , and  .  The strictly positive marginal costs imply that real 
resources—specialized scarce inputs, employees, and equipment—must be expended to gain any 
new knowledge.13  A subtle issue is whether research and experience are substitutes, in which 
case  , or complements, making  .  
() 0 h Rh> (0) 0 h R = 0 hh R >
0 HQ K ≤ 0 HQ K >
Two price-based policies are directly targeted at renewable energy: a renewable energy 
production subsidy (s), and a renewables technology R&D subsidy in which the government 
offsets a share (σ) of research expenditures.   
In our two-stage model, profits for the representative nonemitting firm are 
  ( ) () ( ) 111 1 1 1 1 222 2 2 2 ( ) (, ) ( 1 ) ( ) (,)
R nPs qG K q R h nPs qG K q πσ δ =+ − − − + + − , (5) 
where  .    22 (, KK H Q = 2 )
                                                 
12 An exception is room for advancement in lowering costs of cleaner generation technologies for fossil fuels, such 
as carbon capture and storage. Our qualitative results should carry over to policies targeting other low-carbon 
technologies, although the quantitative results would depend on the cost, technology, and emissions parameters 
particular to those other technologies.  
13 As a partial equilibrium model, we do not explicitly explore issues of crowding out in the general economy, but 
those opportunity costs may be reflected in the R&D cost function. 
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Letρ  be a factor reflecting the degree of appropriability of returns from investments in 
R&D.14  In the Appendix, this appropriation rate is formally derived for multiple innovating 
firms that derive their own benefits from knowledge and can to some degree appropriate the 
benefits that accrue to others as well.15  Aggregating to our representative firm, appropriated 
benefits can be represented as a share of the total. Thus,  1 ρ =  would reflect an extreme with 
perfect appropriability and no knowledge spillovers, while  0 ρ =  reflects the opposite extreme 
of no private appropriability of knowledge investments. Similarly, 1 ρ −  reflects the degree of 
knowledge spillovers.  We assume that all knowledge is ultimately adopted, either by imitation 
or licensing. Therefore, the spillover factor does not enter directly into the aggregate profit 
function, which reflects operating profits. Licensing revenues also do not appear because they 
represent transfers among firms.  However, the spillover factor does enter into the first-order 
conditions for R&D and learning, since it determines the share of future profit changes that can 
be appropriated by the representative innovator.  These issues are further elaborated in the 
Appendix. 
Taking knowledge spillovers into account, the firm maximizes profits with respect to 
output in each stage and R&D investment, yielding the following first-order conditions: 
  ()
1
11 1 11 2 221 2 2 (,) (,) (,) 0
R





=+ − − =
∂
, 











= , and   
  11 2 2 2 1 2 2
1
(1 ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) 0
R





=− − − =
∂
. 
                                                 
N
14 We model general knowledge as being appropriable, with no distinction according to the source of that 
knowledge, R&D or learning. While an empirical basis is lacking for such a distinction, one might expect that some 
forms of learning are less easily appropriated by other firms. We discuss the implication of relaxing this assumption 
in the context of the numerical simulations. 
15 With N identical firms, the appropriable share of total gains is  (1 ( 1)) / N ρ ω = +− , where ω  is the 
appropriation rate from other firms.  
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Rearranging, we get 
  ,   (6)  11 1 1 2 22 22 (,) (,)(, qK GKq P s n GKqKHQ δρ =+− ) Q
  22 2 2 (,) q GKq P s = + , and  (7) 
  12 2 2 () ( , ) ( , )
(1 )







As shown in equation (6), the renewable energy sector produces until the marginal cost of 
production equals the value it receives from additional output, including the market price, any 
production subsidy, and the appropriable contribution of such output to future cost reduction 
through learning by doing (note that the last term in equation (6) is positive overall).  Second-
stage output does not generate a learning benefit, so there is no related term in equation (7). 
Meanwhile, as shown in equation (8), the firm also invests in research until the discounted 
appropriated returns from R&D equal investment costs on the margin. 
Note that if appropriation rates are imperfect ( 1 ρ < ), from a societal perspective, firms 
have insufficient incentive to engage in extra production for the purpose of learning by doing. 
Similarly, if the R&D subsidy does not fully reflect the spillover values ( 1 σ ρ <− ), firms have 
insufficient incentive to invest in R&D. Thus, a knowledge externality accompanies the 
emissions externality, and both can be affected by policies that target one or the other.  
2.3.  Consumer demand 
Renewable energy generation and fossil-fueled production are assumed to be perfect 
substitutes.  We abstract from short-run peak-pricing variations and take a longer-term view of 
demand and supply curves. Let   be the consumer demand for electricity, a function of the 
price, where  . Consumer surplus is therefore  .  Thus, the change in 
consumer surplus due to the renewable energy policy in this partial equilibrium model is 
( ) DP
() 0 DP ′ < ()
t P CS D P dP
∞
=∫






CS n D P dP n D P dP δ
⎛⎞
∆= − − ⎜ ⎜
⎝⎠ ∫∫ ⎟ ⎟
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In equilibrium, total consumption must equal total supply, the sum of fossil-fueled and 
renewable energy generation:16   
 () tt t DP x y q t = ++. (10) 
2.4.  Economic surplus 
Policies also have implications for government revenues, which we denote as V.  We 
assume that these revenues are raised or returned in a lump-sum fashion. The change in these 
transfers equals the tax revenues net of the cost of the subsidies:  
() ( ) 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 ()( ) ( ) xy xy Vn f x y s q R h n f x y s q φτ µ µ σ δ φ τ µ µ ∆= + + − − + + + − . (11) 
Note that while we have assumed here that the emissions price results in government revenue, 
either through a tax or auctioned permit system, a permit system with free allocation would yield 
the same overall results in our model, with rents accruing to the permit holders, rather than 
generating government transfers.  If, on the other hand, tax revenue changes were recycled by 
lowering more distortionary taxes in the economy, the revenue-raising policy options would 
perform relatively better. Incorporating such a feature would tend to widen the efficiency-cost 
gaps we find in our results. 
Environmental benefits (i.e., reduced climate damages) are a function of the annual 
emissions and the length of each stage.  To be able to accommodate both for flow and stock 
pollutants, we write this function in a general form: 
  1 212 0 012 (, ,,) (,,,) B BE E n n BE E n n ∆= − . (12) 
The change in economic surplus due to a policy is the environmental benefits net of the 
sum of the changes in consumer and producer surplus and revenue transfers from the subsidy or 
tax: 
                                                 
16 Note that in the empirical application, we allow for a fixed level of nuclear and hydro generation, which are not 
expected to change as a function of the policies we evaluate.  As a result, demand can be considered as the residual 
after this exogenous supply. 
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  WB C S V π ∆= ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ , (13) 
where  , where 
RFO t ππ π π ∆= ∆ + ∆ + ∆
h e r y Fx π ππ ∆ =∆ +∆ . “Other” profits represent the 
change in revenues for other baseload generators, as we include nuclear and hydropower in our 
simulations; these generators have fixed costs and capacities and profit to the extent the 
electricity price rises.   
However, economic surplus is unlikely to be the only metric for evaluating policy.  Other 
indicators may be total emissions, consumer surplus, renewable energy market share, and so on.  
General equilibrium factors—like interactions with tax distortions, leakage, or other market 
failures—can also be important for determining welfare impacts.17  Political economy constraints 
may also be important for determining policy goals.  To the extent that these unmodeled issues 
are present, this partial equilibrium presentation of economic surplus within the sector will not 
reflect the full social impacts; still, it represents a useful baseline metric. 
2.5.  Comparative statics 
In this section, we consider the equilibrium effect of small changes in the different taxes 
and subsidies; we assume, here and in our numerical simulations, that these policy prices are 
held constant across both periods.  In the market equilibrium, we have the market-clearing 
condition (10), the first-order conditions for fossil-fueled generation (equations (3)–(4)) and 
renewable generation (equations (6)–(8)), and an equation governing knowledge accumulation.  
Totally differentiating these equations, and noting that  ( ) 21 1 1 =+ HQ dK n K dh K dq , we derive a 
system of equations governing the responses to the different policy options: 
  ( )/( ) tt t t dP dx dy dq D P t ′ =+ + , (14) 
  ( / tt t x t dx dP d d C φµ τ ) x ′′ =− − , (15) 
                                                 
17 Allowing for distortionary taxes in the model is likely to widen the efficiency gap between revenue-raising 
policies (e.g., emissions taxes) and revenue-using policies (e.g., renewable subsidies). For a comprehensive survey 
of the tax interaction literature, see Goulder (2002). For a discussion of emissions leakage, see Bernard et al. 
(forthcoming) or Fischer and Fox (forthcoming). 
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  ( )/ tt t y t dy dP d d C φµ τ y ′′ =− − , (16) 
  ( ) 22 2 / tq K q dq dP ds G dK G =+ − q , (17) 
  ( )
()
11 2 2 1 2
1 2
12
Kq Q K HQ KK Q H
qq K QQ KK Q
dP ds n G K dq n n G K G K K dh
dq
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.   (19) 
The incidence of the policies in equilibrium is complicated by the incorporation of 
impacts on knowledge accumulation. It is therefore helpful to begin by focusing on some of the 
components. Substituting (15) and (16) into (14) and solving for  , we derive the electricity 
price impacts for each period as a function of the policies affecting the fossil-fueled sector and 
the contemporaneous change in renewable output: 
t dP
  ( )() ( ) ( ) ( ) / ty x t t t x y t x y x y dP C C d d C C dq C C C C D φµ τ ′′ ′ ′ ′ ′′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′′ ′′ =+ + − + − , (20) 
where  ( ) ( ) / ty x x yy x CC C C µµ µ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ =+ +  is an average emissions rate for the fossil-fueled sector, 
weighted by the slope of the supply curves. In other words, the retail price of electricity is 
increasing in the fossil-fueled output tax and the emissions tax and decreasing as renewable 
energy increases (which lowers necessary fossil-fueled supply). For additional simplification 
going forward, let this denominator be represented by  xyx y CCC C D χ ′′′ ′′ ′ ′ ′ ′ =+− . 
Substituting (20) back into (15) and (16), we solve for the impacts on fossil-fueled 
generation: 
  () ( ) ( ) (1 ty t y x y dx C D d dq d C D / φ τµ µ χ ′′ ′′ ′′ =− + − −, and  (21) 
  () ( ) ( ) (1 tx t x y x dy C D d dq d C D / φ τµ µ χ ′′ ′′ ′ =− + − − ′ . (22) 
These expressions reveal that both fossil-fueled generation sources decline as the fossil output 
tax increases and as renewable generation expands. The effect of the emissions tax is twofold: (i) 
a direct increase in costs that reduces generation in proportion to each source’s emissions rate, 
and (ii) an indirect effect that increases generation as a result of price increases due to cost 
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increases in the other fossil source. The net effect can be positive or negative for natural gas, 
which emits CO2, but at about half the intensity of coal. 
Substituting (18) into (20) into (17), we solve for the equilibrium impacts on future renewable 
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Equation (23) reveals that second-period renewable output is increasing in all of the policy levers 
and in knowledge.18  Furthermore, substituting (23) into (20) and solving for  , we see that the 
change in the second-period electricity price is a weighted sum of the tax-induced cost increases 
on the fossil-fueled sector, and the cost decreases due to technological change in the renewable 
sector: 
2 dP
  () ( ) 22 2 2 2 22 1 2
FR
qK dP d d ds nG dK ωφ µ τω =+ − − , (24) 
where 
( ) 22 /
F
qq x y GC C ω ζ ′′ ′′ =+ 22 /
R
xy CC ωζ ′′′ ′ = , and  , 
( ) 2 x y qq x y qq x y CC G C C GCCD ζ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′ =+ + − . 
Note that the effect of the policies on the price of electricity depends on the relative 
slopes of all of the supply curves, as well as that of electricity demand.  The price influence of 
policy changes targeting fossil fuels increases with steeper renewable energy supply and flatter 
fossil energy supply, because the flexibility to switch toward renewables is relatively more 
limited in these cases.  The opposite is true for the price influence of renewable sector impacts: 
they are stronger when the renewable energy supply curve is flatter or the fossil energy supply 
curves are steeper. 
                                                 
18 Knowledge is itself increasing in these policy levers, in part because it is increasing in second-period output, and 
because some policies directly subsidize knowledge accumulation through learning or R&D. 
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We see similar effects in the first period, but the incidence of the policies is complicated 
by the endogeneity of knowledge accumulation and second-period production. Equation (18) 
shows that first-period renewables output is increasing in the electricity price, the renewable 
subsidy, and in second-period renewable output due to learning investments. The effect of R&D 
(h1) on first-period renewables output is more ambiguous: a positive R&D response will tend to 
temper the impact somewhat (due to diminishing returns to knowledge generation 
), but complementarity between learning and R&D could possibly reinforce it 
(i.e., if  ).   
0 KK Q H GK K −<
0 HQ K >
We observe a similar ambiguity from the R&D equation (19). While R&D is increasing 
in the R&D subsidy and in second-period renewables output, it is ambiguously related to first-
period renewables output, depending on whether R&D and learning are substitutes or 
complements. 
Substituting (18), (21), and (22), into (14) and solving for  , we again find price effects 
are a weighted sum of the increase in the fossil-sector tax burden and the decrease in effective 
costs to renewable production, including the incentives from knowledge accumulation: 
1 dP
() ( ) ( ) () 11 1 1 1 11 2 1 1 2
FR
KQ H K KQH K qQ dP d d ds n n G K G K K dh G K dq ωφ µ τω δ ρ =+ − − + + , (25) 
where  () () ( )
2
11 2 1 /
F
q q KQ Q K KQ x y Gn n G K G K C C ω δρ ζ ′′ ′′ =+ + + 11 /
R
xy CC ωζ ′′′ ′ = ,  , and 
.  () ()
2
11 2 x y q q KQ Q K KQ CC G n n GK G K ζχ δ ρ ′′ ′′ =+ + +
Again, the weights on the cost impacts targeting the fossil and renewable energy sectors depend, 
in ways similar to the second period, on the relative slopes of the supply curves.  The difference 
is that in the first period, the effective supply curve for renewable energy includes the impacts on 
second-period costs through knowledge accumulation. 
To summarize, with the exception of the R&D subsidy, the impact of a policy change on 
the equilibrium price in each period has two components. First is a direct effect in proportion to 
the policy change (tax or subsidy); second is an indirect effect due to corresponding changes in 
knowledge accumulation and second-period output.  The R&D subsidy, on the other hand, only 
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induces an indirect effect on prices, through its impact on second-period renewable costs and the 
first-period benefits to learning.  In all cases, the strength of these direct and indirect effects 
depends on the relative slopes of the supply and demand curves, which ultimately determine the 
overall price impact. 
2.6.  Optimal policy 
In weighing different policy options, it is useful to bear in mind what the efficient policy 
combinations would be.  In this situation, three policies are needed to optimally address three 
externalities: emissions, R&D spillovers, and learning spillovers. An appropriate emissions price 
internalizes the first externality. To determine the optimal subsidies for R&D and learning, we 
find what is necessary to align the private first-order conditions with those of the social planner. 
At the optimum, a coordinated research and learning program would yield 
  () 11 11 2 221 22
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That is, the imperfect appropriability would not influence the investment decisions.  
Rearranging, we get 
  , and  (28)  11 1 2 22 2 2 (, ) (,)(,) qK Q GKq P n GKqKHQ δ =−
  . (29)  12 2 22 () ( , ) ( , ) hK H Rh n G KqK HQ δ =− 2
1
Setting the right-hand sides of (28) and (6) equal to each other, as well as those of (29) and (8), 
we can solve for the optimal R&D and learning subsidies when spillovers are present: 
  σ ρ = − , and  (30) 
  . (31)  12 2 2 (1 ) ( , ) ( , ) KQ sn G K q K H ρδ =− − 2 2 Q
In other words, an R&D subsidy is needed to offset the unappropriable share of R&D returns, 
and a renewable generation subsidy is needed to offset the unappropriated gains from learning. 
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3.  Policy scenarios 
As developed in the modeling section, renewable energy production depends on the price 
received by that sector, the cost of R&D investment, and the degree of appropriability of 
knowledge investments.  Fossil-fueled energy production and the accompanying emissions 
depend on the amount of renewables sector output, the after-tax price of electricity, and the price 
of emissions.  Consumer demand depends on the price of electricity.  Different policies vary in 
their effects on these different prices, resulting in different market equilibria. As we will see, the 
policies therefore provide varying incentives for emissions reduction along these different 
margins—emissions intensity, energy conservation, and renewable energy output—leading to a 
divergence in their relative efficacy at reducing emissions. Different policies also compensate for 
knowledge spillovers to different degrees, also contributing to different impacts on economic 
surplus. 
3.1.  No policy 
We define   as the baseline price of electricity generation, in the absence of policy (i.e., 
0
t P
0 ttt s φ τσ ==== ); the first-order conditions for production imply that output prices equal this 
baseline price in both markets and in each period: .  We assume that an interior solution 
exists—that is, that some renewable energy is viable without any policy.  A sufficient condition 
would be that  . However, renewable energy production could occur even if 
marginal production costs are higher than the price in the first stage, as long as the value of 
learning by doing for lowering second-stage costs is sufficient. As a result, even without policy, 
we would expect baseline prices to decline over time, due to knowledge accumulation in the 




1 (, 0 ) q GK P < 1
3.2.  Fixed-price policies 
We look first at three policies that directly set prices: an emissions price, a renewables 
production subsidy, and a tax on fossil-based production. All three policies increase prices for 
renewables, which expands production and also induces more innovation. They differ in their 
effects on fossil energy production and emissions reduction. 
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3.2.1  Emissions price 
With a direct price for emissions ( t τ )—via either an emissions tax or a tradable emissions 
permit system—the fossil-fueled sector has an incentive to switch away from coal-fired 
generation.  As we see in Equations (24) and (25), the market price of electricity increases in 
proportion to the weighted average emissions charge on fossil-fueled generation. Without other 
subsidies, the renewables sector receives the market price for electricity, and the price increase 
promotes greater renewable energy generation in both stages.  The prospect of more output in the 
second stage increases knowledge investment incentives in the renewables sector, for both R&D 
and learning.  The higher market price also means consumers have added incentive to conserve.  
As seen in (21), the price increase does not fully compensate for the increase in the marginal 
costs of coal-fired generation (since  ty tx τ µτ µ < ), resulting in less use of coal. Gas-fired 
generation may expand, however, if that option is more cost-effective than additional 
conservation or renewables on the margin.   
In the absence of knowledge spillovers, the emissions price would provide efficient 
incentives for achieving a given emissions reduction goal, since it provides equalized incentives 
for emissions reduction along all three margins—reduced emissions intensity, demand 
conservation (via price increase), and increased renewable energy production.  In the presence of 
spillovers, however, a price reflecting the marginal damage from emissions would not offer 
efficient incentives to contribute to knowledge formation. The degree of inefficiency is an 
empirical matter, which we explore further below.  
3.2.2  Renewable power output subsidy 
A renewables production subsidy ( ) boosts the price received by the renewable energy 
sector and lowers its effective marginal cost relative to other sources. By putting downward 
pressure on the price of electricity, the renewables production subsidy crowds out fossil-fueled 
generation in both stages to reduce emissions. Because the market price of electricity declines, 
electricity use actually increases.  Also, because there is no direct price on emissions, there is no 
discrimination between coal- and gas-fired generation in order to reduce emissions intensity.  
t s
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3.2.3  Fossil power output tax 
The analytic structure of a fossil-fueled production tax ( t φ ) is similar to the renewables 
subsidy because it raises the price received by renewables, except that it does so through higher 
consumer prices for electricity, rather than a direct subsidy. Thus, both the market price and the 
effective price received by renewables rise in proportion to the tax.  Although no incentive exists 
to reduce output or emissions specifically from coal relative to gas plants, to the extent that 
demand falls due to higher prices, fossil-fueled output and emissions will be lower than under an 
equivalent renewable energy subsidy.  
3.2.4  R&D subsidy for renewable energy technology 
Without a price on emissions or tax/subsidy on output, output prices in both markets are 
affected only indirectly.  The primary effect of the R&D subsidy (σ ) is to increase research 
expenditures and lower future renewables costs, crowding out fossil-fueled generation in the 
second stage.  The R&D policy provides no incentive for energy conservation or reduction in 
coal relative to natural gas generation. 
3.3.  Rate-based policies 
Two rate-based policies familiar to the electricity generation sector are portfolio 
standards and tradable performance standards.  A portfolio standard requires a certain percentage 
of generation to come from renewable energy sources.  A tradable performance standard—
sometimes called a “generation performance standard” in the context of climate policies for the 
electricity sector—mandates that average emissions intensity per unit of output not exceed a 
standard.  Both policies create effective taxes on fossil-fueled generation and subsidies for 
renewable energy sources. However, those prices are not fixed, as in the previous policies, but 
rather adjust endogenously according to market conditions to achieve the targeted rate.   
Endogenous prices raise additional issues with respect to innovation incentives.  
Essentially, as increased knowledge brings down the costs of renewable energy, a given standard 
become less costly to meet, which is then reflected in the implicit taxes and subsidies.  The 
question is how the renewable energy sector perceives any such price changes. Do firms in the 
22 Resources for the Future  Fischer and Newell 
sector recognize the impact of their innovation decisions on future prices? Do they myopically 
expect prices to remain unchanged?  Or do they expect the future prices, and take them as given, 
as do competitive firms?   
A long literature recognizes that innovation incentives differ, depending on the structure 
of markets for output and for innovation.19  Given our starting assumptions of a representative, 
perfectly competitive firm, we will proceed with the assumption that firms in the renewable 
energy sector have perfect foresight about price changes and take them as given.  That is, each 
firm expects knowledge to accumulate and permit prices to respond to that accumulation; 
however, no individual firm expects to influence future prices by its own R&D or learning. In 
recognizing the equilibration of future prices, R&D incentives are diminished relative to a case 
of myopic expectations. If firms were to expect their own actions to further reduce those prices, 
the expected returns to knowledge would also fall.20 In the numerical simulations, we assume 
that the rate-based targets are adjusted such that the equilibrium price premium to renewables 
remains constant over time. Closer examination of these issues may be of interest in future work.   
3.3.1  Renewable energy portfolio standard 
We model the portfolio standard as a requirement that a specific percentage of generation 
be from renewable energy sources in each stage.  We assume that responsibility lies with the 
emitting industry to satisfy the portfolio constraint.  Thus, the fossil-fueled producer must 
purchase or otherwise ensure a share of at least  t α  units of renewable energy for every (1 ) t α −  
units of fossil-fueled generation, or  /(1 ) tt α α −  green certificates for every unit generated.  
Furthermore, we allow the standard to tighten over time, to allow for easier comparison with the 
price mechanisms and to better reflect actual policy proposals. 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Milliman and Prince (1989), Biglaiser and Horowitz (1995), Jung et al. (1996), Fischer et al. (2003), 
Requate and Unold (2002).  Dynamic problems are also treated in Petrakis et al. (1999) and Kennedy and Laplante 
(1999). 
20 This contrasts somewhat to the case in the previously cited studies like Fischer et al. (2003), in which innovators 
are permit buyers, not sellers. 
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In equilibrium, the incentives correspond to a combination of a fossil-fueled production 
tax and a renewable energy subsidy.  Assuming the renewable market share constraint binds, the 
renewable energy sector receives a subsidy per unit output equal to the price of a green 
certificate,  , where “^” denotes equilibrium values under the portfolio standard.  The effective 
tax per unit of fossil-fueled output under this policy, 
ˆt s
ˆ
t φ , is then proportional to the effective 
subsidy to the renewable energy producer: 












The implicit tax and subsidy are determined competitively by the market to meet the portfolio 
constraint, as is the electricity price.  
The portfolio standard provides no incentive to reduce coal reliance relative to gas, but 
crowds out fossil-fueled generation by implicitly taxing it and subsidizing renewables compared 
to the market price. Since it combines a fossil energy tax (which raises electricity prices) with a 
renewables subsidy (which lowers electricity prices), the portfolio standard has an ambiguous 
effect on consumer prices, resulting in limited energy conservation incentives, if any.21   
Another important difference is that, for a given portfolio standard, the implicit tax and 
subsidy decline with reductions in renewable energy costs.  This occurs because the implicit 
tax/subsidies reflect the shadow cost of meeting the renewables production constraint, and this 
shadow cost declines as the cost of renewables production declines.  As a result, to maintain 
constant policy prices over time, the portfolio standard must become more stringent. 
3.3.2  Emissions performance standard 
While a portfolio standard requires a certain percentage of renewable energy, a 
performance standard requires a maximum average emissions intensity of fossil and renewable 
generation combined.  With a tradable performance standard of  t µ , the emitting firm must buy 
                                                 
21 For further discussion, see Amundsen and Mortensen (2001) and Fischer (2006). 
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emissions permits to the extent that its emissions rate exceeds that standard. The price of 
emissions at time t,  t τ% , will now be determined by a market equilibrium, denoted by “~”.  All 
firms are in effect allocated  t µ  permits per unit of output, which leads to an implicit subsidy of 
tt τ µ %  per unit of output. Thus, if the standard is binding, the fossil-fueled sector will be a net 
buyer of permits costing  ( tx t ) τ µµ − %  per unit of output for coal generation and  () ty t τ µµ − %  for 
natural gas generation. (Note, however, that if the emissions intensity of gas is less than the 
standard y t µ µ < , gas generation becomes a net seller of permits.) The renewables sector will be a
seller of permits valued at 
 
tt τ µ  p % er unit of output.  
Thus, the emissions performance standard corresponds to a combination of an emissions 
price ( t τ% ), and a generation subsidy for both renewables ( ) and fossil energy producers ( t s % t φ − % ), 
where 
  . tt t t s τ µφ = =−% %%  (33) 
The equilibrium values are determined in conjunction with the previous market-clearing 
conditions for energy supply and demand, along with the additional emissions constraint that 
  ( xt yt t t t ) x yq f µ µµ + ≤+ . (34) 
The impact of the emissions performance standard on electricity prices could be positive 
or negative, depending on whether the effect of the implicit tax on emissions dominates the 
effect of the implicit subsidy.  The relative effects depend in large part on the slopes of the 
marginal cost curves.  Because of the implicit output subsidy, conservation incentives (if any) are 
limited.  As a consequence, compared to an equivalent pure emissions price (i.e., if  tt τ τ = % ), total 
emissions are higher.   
Like the portfolio standard, a fixed performance standard implies a subsidy that changes 
as renewable costs fall.  Furthermore, an expansion of renewable energy allows fossil-fueled 
sector emissions to increase.  Some of this will arise from greater production and some from 
increased emissions intensity, as the permit price falls.  Thus, to maintain prices for renewables, 
the standard would have to tighten over time. 
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3.4.  Summary comparison of policies 
Promoting renewable energy may be a policy goal in itself, such as for diversifying the 
energy supply portfolio and insulating it somewhat from nonrenewable energy price shocks.  
However, from an environmental perspective, the policy goal is more likely to be limiting 
emissions.  In that case, as explained above, the relative performance of the different policies 
depends on their influence on emissions intensity, overall energy consumption, renewable energy 
production, and R&D.22 Table 1 summarizes the incentive effects from each of these policies 
along these different dimensions.  The strength of these effects will in turn determine fossil 
output, emissions, and overall effects on economic surplus.  The relative efficiency of these 
policies in reducing emissions tends to follow the degree to which they provide incentives along 
all the relevant dimensions, but particularly for fuel switching among fossil sources and for 
raising electricity prices, which promotes both conservation and renewable energy expansion. As 
one moves from the left of Table 1 to the right, therefore, efficiency tends to decrease, although 
the precise ranking of instruments depends on the relative strength of the different incentives in 
particular empirical circumstances.   
The revenue and distributional implications of the different policies are also quite 
different.  The fossil-based output tax raises revenue, as does the emissions price if it is 
implemented through auctioned permits or emissions taxes. Price increases are borne by 
producers and consumers, in relation to supply and demand elasticities.  The renewables subsidy 
and R&D subsidy require outlays of public funds; taxpayers support the renewable energy 
producers, while electricity consumers and fossil producers are held harmless.  The standards 
involve no net revenue change, implicitly earmarking the net costs of these policies back to 
                                                 
22 Goulder et al. (1999) make a related distinction among different types of emissions policies and the relative 
strength of incentives they provide for abatement, input substitution, and output substitution. 
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consumers and producers.  The net effects on economic surplus depend on the magnitude of the 
efficiency loss in the process. 
We will further demonstrate this ranking numerically as we parameterize the model in the 
next section.  Since no one policy perfectly addresses all market failures—the emissions 
externality and knowledge spillovers from both R&D and learning—a clear ranking cannot be 
derived analytically. Each policy applies a different set of levers, for which the relative 
effectiveness depends on the particular parameters.  For example, a tradable performance 
standard can reduce the emissions intensity of fossil-fueled generation and subsidize renewable 
energy, but it discourages conservation. Therefore, it may or may not outperform a fossil energy 
tax or renewable subsidy alone.  Thus, we turn to a numerical application to explore both the 
magnitude of the efficiency cost differences and their sensitivity to specific parameter 
assumptions. 
4.  Numerical application to U.S. electricity production  
In this section we apply the theory developed above to a stylized representation of the 
U.S. electricity production sector. We begin by specifying functional forms that have the general 
properties given above, that correspond to available information on the form of particular 
relationships, and that are empirically tractable. We also describe the empirical derivation of 
values for necessary parameters and base levels of variables using available information. Table 2 
summarizes the parameter values used in the numerical application. We then go on to describe 
the results of our central scenario, as well as sensitivity analyses that vary the relative importance 
of technological change through learning by doing versus R&D, the degree of knowledge 
appropriability, the elasticity of demand, the relative length of the two time periods, and the 
degree of policy stringency. 
4.1.  Functional form and parametric assumptions 
We specify quadratic cost functions for coal-based and natural gas-based electricity 
generation   and  , thereby yielding 
2
01 2 () / 2 =+ + xt x x t xt Cx c c x cx
2
01 2 () / 2 =+ + yt y y t yt Cy c c y cy
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linear electricity supply curves for each fuel,  12 () ′ = + xt x xt Cx c cx  and  12 () ′ =+ yt y yt Cy c cy . We 
also assume that the cost function for renewables generation is quadratic in output, 
( ) (
1





, yielding a linear renewables supply curve, 
. Total and marginal costs of renewables generation are proportional 
to the inverse of the knowledge stock, so that technological change lowers both the intercept and 
slope of the renewables supply curve.  
() (
1
12 , qt t t t GK q K g g q
− =+
We calibrate the values of  , and   to a recent set of simulations of the 
electricity market impacts of alternative CO2 reduction goals from the Energy Information 
Administration’s (EIA) National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) (EIA 2006).23 The CO2 
intensities of coal-based and natural-gas-based electricity are set to 
12 ,, xx y ccc 2 y c
0.96 x µ =  and  0.42 y µ =  
kilograms of CO2 per kWh (kgCO2/kWh) respectively based on the same EIA study (EIA 2006). 
These emissions intensities are not projected to change measurably under the climate policies 
modeled. The baseline price of electricity is 7.3 cents per kilowatt-hour based on projected future 
values of the average price of electricity (EIA 2006). See Table 2 for parameter values and other 
assumptions; all monetary values are inflation-adjusted to year 2004 values. 
To set a value for the slope of the renewable supply function ( ) we rely on recent 
studies of proposed national renewable portfolio standards (EIA 2003a, Palmer and Burtraw 
2004), which suggest that a 10% renewable share would lead to a renewable credit price of about 
0.03 $/kWh. This implies a slope of the renewable supply function of   $/kWh
2. 
We solve for the intercept of the renewable supply function so that the numerical model yields 
baseline annual renewable generation of 1.4 x 10
11 kWh (EIA 2006 projection for 2010), 
yielding   $/kWh. 
2 g
13
2 1.2 10 g
− =×
1 0.060 g =
                                                 
23 This and other studies support the assumption of approximately linear marginal abatement costs over the policy 
range we explore. 
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We specify a knowledge stock having a constant elasticity relationship with respect to 













, implying that 
. We normalize the first period R&D knowledge stock so that  1 1 K = 1 1 H = .  This functional 
form has commonly been used for this relationship, and it is empirically supported by studies of 
the relationship between learning by doing and product costs and the relationship between 
productivity and R&D.  This functional form implies complementarity between R&D and 
learning, which is supported by the limited empirical evidence available (Lieberman 1984). We 
set   kWh so that annual renewable energy generation represents about a 10% 
contribution to the stock of experience, which is consistent with the current U.S. contribution of 
wind, solar, and biomass generation to cumulative U.S. output of these energy sources (EIA 
2002).  
12
1 1.4 10 Q =×
We set the values for k1 and k2 in our central scenario based on several pieces of 
evidence. Different approaches to the empirical study of technological change suggest that it is 
reasonable to set benchmark values of  1 0.15 k =  and  2 0.15 k = , putting their sum at about 0.3. 
Numerous empirical “learning curve” studies of learning by doing estimate the elasticity of 
product costs (or prices) with respect to cumulative production. These studies find a peak in the 
distribution of estimated elasticities at about 0.30 (Argote and Epple 1990). Specifically with 
regard to renewable energy, the International Energy Agency (2000) suggests the learning rate 
for electricity from wind has also been about 0.30.  
One of the reasons for the pervasive relationship between cumulative production and 
product cost declines is likely to be the common decision rule in many firms of allocating a 
given percentage of revenues to R&D. As R&D is typically not explicitly included in learning 
curve analyses, the effect of output-proportionate R&D investments will tend to be reflected in 
the estimated learning elasticity. Thus, it is probably appropriate to view many estimated 
learning rates as closer to the sum of k1 and k2 rather than k1 alone.  The National Energy 
Modeling System, for example, assumes a maximum learning rate of 0.10 for renewable energy 
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technologies within its electricity market module (EIA 2003b), but also includes other sources of 
technological change in the model structure. 
A distinct line of research has investigated the relationship of production and cost 
functions and the stock of R&D knowledge, typically based on a constructed stock of R&D 
capital. The elasticity of R&D in these studies tends to be around 0.08 to 0.30 (Nadiri 1993), 
again suggesting that a value of   is reasonable. Porter and Stern (2000) use a patent-
based measure of the knowledge stock, finding that a doubling of the patent stock leads to about 
a 10% increase in total factor productivity. This is also consistent with an elasticity of 
2 0.15 k =
2 0.15 k = . 
Our assumptions regarding the values of k1 and k2 are also supported by empirical evidence from 
Klaassen et al. (2005) on learning in electricity production from wind. 
In our sensitivity analysis, we explore different relative contributions of learning and 
R&D to knowledge, while holding constant the rate of technological change (i.e., decline in 
renewable energy costs) achieved in the central case. This reflects our sense that while there is an 
empirically observable overall rate of technological change, it is very difficult in practice to 
distinguish its underlying sources, be it learning or R&D. The level of cost reduction turns out to 
be 12% over the five years from the first to second stage of the model, which is reasonable given 
recent historical and projected future cost declines for renewable energy. 
A constant elasticity R&D investment function, ( )
1
10 1 R hh
γ γ = , has the desired properties 
set out above so long as  1 1 γ > . We set  1 1.2 γ =  based on a number of firm-level empirical 
studies of the relationship between knowledge generation, as measured by patenting, and 
investments in R&D.24 Second, we assume that annual R&D spending is 3% of revenues or $300 
million in the baseline, which corresponds to the average R&D intensity of U.S. industry (NSF 
                                                 
24 In a review of the evidence on whether there are diminishing returns to R&D, Griliches (1990) suggests that for 
larger firms the degree of diminishing returns is only slight. In one of the most directly relevant studies in this area, 
Jaffe (1986) finds an elasticity of patents with respect to R&D of over 0.8 in his preferred specification. Other 
related studies have found a relationship of similar magnitude (Bottazzi and Peri 2003). Our model uses the inverse 
of this elasticity, with the comparable knowledge production to R&D elasticity being 1 1.2 0.83 = .  
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2006) and is consistent with the limited information available on current private U.S. renewables 
R&D spending (NCEP 2004). Calibrating the model to all the other baseline assumptions yields 
the value   for the central scenario.  
9
0 3.9 10 γ =×
Drawing from a sizable empirical literature estimating the private and social returns to 
knowledge (e.g., Griliches 1992; Nadiri 1993; and Jones and Williams 1998), we set  0.50 ρ = , 
which is consistent with a social return to knowledge (i.e., including spillovers) that is roughly 
twice the private return.25 We explore a range of appropriability factors from 0.25 to 1.0 in 
sensitivity analysis. 
We assume a constant elasticity of aggregate electricity demand with respect to the price 
of electricity, ε, so that  ( ) 00 () / tt DD P P P d D d P =+ − , where  0 /( ) dD dP D P P 0 / ε = . We assume 
ε=-0.20 based on the implied elasticity from the EIA-NEMS climate policy study discussed 
above. We set baseline energy demand at 4.20 x 10
12 kWh in 2010 based on projected coal-based 
generation of 2.29 x 10
12 kWh, natural gas generation of 0.67 x 10
12 kWh, renewable generation 
of 0.14 x 10
12 kWh, and nuclear and hydro generation of 1.10 x 10
12 kWh (EIA 2006). We hold 
nuclear and hydro constant in the simulation as these generation sources are not expected to 
change in response to the policies we evaluate (EIA 2006). We consider a first stage of length 
 years, which is typical of the time required for new innovations to be brought to market 
(Newell et al. 1999). We discount the second stage back to the present at a private real rate of 
return of 10% (so that 
1 5 n =
0.62 δ = ), and consider a second stage of 20 years in length, whose flows 
we discounted back to the start of the second stage at 10% (so that  2 8.5 n = ). Twenty years is a 
typical cost recovery time frame used for analysis of electricity generation technologies (EIA 
2003b). 
                                                 
25 The empirical parameter values governing technological change in the central scenario of our numerical 
application are based on econometric and other evidence generated in the presence of existing R&D policy. The 
measured private versus social rate of return to R&D, and the spillover and appropriability rate implicit in this 
divergence, therefore incorporate preexisting corrective policies. Since social returns remain above private returns, 
we find a positive optimal R&D subsidy in addition to preexisting policy. 
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4.2.  Policy simulation approach 
The baseline outcomes of this model in the absence of policy are given in Table 3. We 
begin the policy simulations by computing the effects of an emissions price of $7 per ton of CO2 
in place throughout the model horizon (or about $25 per ton of carbon). For the alternatives, we 
compute the level of the policy necessary to achieve the same total level of emissions as the 
emissions price. In holding total emissions constant across the alternative policies, we seek to 
hold the environmental benefits of the policies constant so that we can consider differences in the 
consequences for economic surplus across policies as arising solely from differences in 
consumer surplus, producer surplus, and transfers related to electricity consumption and 
production. This approach is reasonable so long as the marginal benefits of emissions reduction 
are fairly constant in the level of reductions and over the relevant time horizon, which is a 
reasonable assumption for CO2 emissions (Newell and Pizer 2003).   
For the two rate-based policies (portfolio standard and emissions performance standard), 
we set the rates so that the price of credits is the same in the two periods, while meeting the 
emissions target. As shown in Table 4, this results in an increasing stringency of the rate-based 
policies over time. It is worth noting that the resulting renewable portfolio standard rises from 
6% in the first period to 9% in the second period, which is very close to a recent policy proposal 
for a national renewable portfolio standard rising from 5% by 2012 to 10% by 2020 (EIA 
2003a). As the model does not permit an analytical solution, we numerically solve the nonlinear 
system of equations using Newton’s method.  
4.3.  Central scenario 
In reviewing the results of the central scenario (see Table 4 and Table 5), perhaps the first 
point to note is that the emissions price is indeed the most efficient means of achieving a given 
emissions target, leading to the least cost in terms of surplus, and also requiring the least 
investment in renewable energy R&D.  A $7 per ton of CO2 emissions price reduces electricity 
emissions by 4.8% in our central scenario. In the first stage, the CO2 price reduces coal emissions 
by 5.7%, encourages switching to natural gas generation (which increases by 7.6%), reduces 
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electricity consumption by 1.0% due to a 5.3% rise in the price of electricity, and increases 
renewable generation by 23%, the lowest renewable increase of any of the policies. 
Correspondingly, less renewables R&D investment is necessary than under the other policies, 
with R&D rising by 75% over the baseline.  As indicated by the change in consumer surplus, 
however, the burden on consumers may be quite large if they do not benefit from the revenue 
transfers. 
The implicit output subsidy inherent in the tradable performance standard leads to lesser 
reductions coming from consumption (which actually increases slightly due to a fall in electricity 
prices).  Consequently, more reductions must come from displacing coal and expanding 
renewables.  The implicit emissions price inherent in the tradable performance standard is $9.5 
per ton of CO2, or 36% higher than under the explicit emissions price policy.  In the first stage, 
natural gas and renewables are brought in to replace coal; as renewables production increases in 
the second stage it displaces part of this gas increase.  For the renewables sector, the combination 
of the implicit emissions price and renewable subsidy implies a 0.6 cent/kWh increase in the 
price received by renewables, 0.2 cent/kWh higher than under the direct emissions price, 
inducing moderate expansions over that scenario. Overall, the net economic costs are 41% higher 
than the emissions price, making the emissions performance standard the second most cost-
effective instrument.  Since the standard is such that the price of electricity falls (because the 
emissions intensity of gas is less than the standard), consumers directly benefit in this scenario, 
while baseload producers lose revenues; coal producers are hit hardest, due to the higher 
emissions price.   
The output tax of 0.8 cents/kWh, since it does not tax emissions directly, places more of 
the reduction burden on reducing consumption, displacing gas, and increasing renewables. This 
increases the overall cost of the policy by 61% relative to the emissions price. By raising 
electricity prices by about 75% more than the emissions price, the output tax results in a price 
increase for renewables of 0.7 cents/kWh, about 75% more than with the emissions price, 
resulting in comparable increases in renewables output and R&D investment. The fossil output 
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tax also almost doubles the costs to consumers, while government revenues are significantly 
higher than under the emissions price. Profits to producers using nuclear and hydro power 
increase substantially, more than offsetting profit losses of producers that use coal and gas.   
A renewables portfolio standard implicitly combines a nearly 0.1 cent/kWh fossil output 
tax with a 1.2 cent/kWh renewables production subsidy.  With no conservation incentives 
(electricity prices actually decrease by a small amount) and no fossil-fuel-switching incentives, 
renewables must expand three times as much as with the emissions price to meet the target. As a 
result, its performance is 2.04 times as costly as the emissions price in our central scenario.  
Since no revenues are raised and electricity prices fall slightly, producers (in aggregate) bear the 
burden of the policy. Renewable electricity producers gain, while other producers lose. 
Consumers also gain from the price fall, which occurs when the implicit production subsidy 
outweighs the implicit tax on nonrenewable generation. However, the incidence of these implicit 
taxes depends on the relative slopes of the fossil-fueled and renewable supply curves. The 
electricity price would not fall if, for example, the marginal costs of gas-fired generation were 
sufficiently flat (Fischer 2006). 
The renewables production subsidy of 1.4 cents/kWh, to generate the same emissions 
reductions, must be nearly twice the fossil output tax, since electricity consumption is increased, 
rather than reduced, due to a decrease in prices. The effects are similar to the portfolio standard, 
though somewhat larger, since renewables must also accommodate the increased electricity 
consumption.  Consumers face lower electricity costs and renewable electricity producers gain, 
but this is more than offset by the cost to taxpayers and non-renewable electricity producers. The 
overall cost of the policy in achieving emissions reductions is 2.47 times that of the emissions 
price. 
Finally, it may be of little surprise that the renewables research subsidy is by far the most 
costly single policy for reducing emissions, since virtually all the burden of displacing fossil 
output falls in the second stage. Cost-effective early emissions reductions are forgone, and all 
emissions reductions must be gained in the second stage by making renewables less expensive 
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than fossil fuels in the absence of any emissions or conservation incentive. To do so without any 
output or emissions incentive requires costs to fall six times as much as with the emissions tax, 
or 25% overall.  While second-stage renewable output expands by 122%, it also expands in the 
first stage relative to the emissions price, a result of the complementarity of learning with R&D.   
4.4.  Sensitivity analyses 
To illustrate the importance of demand conservation responses to the different policy 
outcomes and to evaluate the role of the technological change process in these results, we 
conduct several sensitivity analyses. The results are given in Table 6, where for brevity we focus 
on the economic surplus of each policy relative to a $7/tonCO2 emissions price policy, as in the 
bottom row of Table 4 for our central scenario (which is repeated as the first row of Table 6 for 
comparison). 
First we vary the elasticity of demand, making it both more elastic (ε = –0.5) than in the 
central scenario and totally inelastic (ε = 0.0). The main effect of a more elastic demand response 
is to worsen the performance of all policies except the fossil output tax relative to an emissions 
price. This occurs because electricity prices actually fall under the other policies, leading to 
increased electricity demand. More elastic demand simply worsens this counterproductive effect, 
while it enhances the conservation incentives of the output tax.  
The scenario of totally inelastic demand illustrates certain equivalencies across different 
policies with respect to incentives not related to conservation, as conservation does not occur 
with fixed demand. As shown in Table 6, the emissions price and the performance standard—the 
two policies that embody incentives for reducing the emissions intensity of fossil fuels—become 
equivalent. This occurs because the performance standard no longer needs to rely on a higher 
implicit emissions price to make up for extra demand induced by the implicit output subsidy.  
Similarly, the output tax, the renewable portfolio standard, and the renewable production subsidy 
become equivalent, since these three policies each rely solely on an increase in the price received 
by renewables to achieve emissions reductions when no conservation is possible. This price rise 
occurs either through a rise in the electricity price (in the case of the output tax), a subsidy to 
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renewable production (in the case of the production subsidy), or some of both (in the case of the 
renewable portfolio standard).26 
Turning now to the sensitivity analyses focused on technological change, we explore four 
scenarios. In the first two, we vary the underlying source of technological change: one in which 
there is no learning (i.e., all technological progress derives from R&D) and another in which 
learning by doing is relatively more important (and R&D less so) than in our central scenario. To 
make these fair comparisons, we maintain the same rate of baseline technological change as in 
our central scenario (i.e., 12% renewable cost reduction in the no-policy case) by adjusting the 
relative effectiveness of learning versus R&D. When these types of sensitivity analysis have 
been conducted in other studies, the resulting rate of technological change has typically been 
altered, with results that are more-or-less predetermined. With no learning effect,  , so we 
increase the effectiveness of R&D on technological change to 
1 0.0 k =
2 0.19 k = . In the scenario with a 
relatively strong learning effect,  , we decrease the effectiveness of R&D to  1 0.20 k = 2 0.13 k = .  
As shown in Table 6, the absence of learning by doing and the strengthening of the effect 
of R&D to compensate make all but the R&D subsidy perform worse relative to the emissions 
price. Without learning by doing, additional renewables production in the first stage has no 
added value as an investment in knowledge, and policies that rely on expanding beyond the 
competitive level of production simply raise costs rather than compensate for spillovers. This 
negative effect is most evident for the renewable production subsidy, although the effect is not 
large for any of the policies. Although the performance of the R&D subsidy improves with the 
increase in the effectiveness of R&D, it remains by far the most costly policy. The sensitivity 
results for the “high learning” case are also shown in Table 6. As one might expect, the 
performance of policies that rely more heavily on near-term renewables expansion improve 
                                                 
26 Of course, if public funds are costly to raise, there would still be welfare differences among the three policies, due 
to their different revenue-raising properties. 
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(although only slightly) relative to the emissions tax, namely all policies but the R&D subsidy. 
The relative performance of the R&D subsidy worsens considerably, due to the diminished 
effectiveness of the R&D stock in boosting knowledge and technological change.  
In two additional, closely-related scenarios, we alter the productivity of R&D-based 
knowledge in lowering costs (i.e.,  2 0.20 k =  and  2 0.10 k = ) without offsetting adjustments to the 
learning rate. This alters the overall rate of technological change, thereby lowering the absolute 
cost of all policies when R&D productivity is increased and increasing the cost of all policies 
when R&D productivity is decreased. The relative performance of policies is affected in a 
similar manner to the above scenarios holding the rate of technological change constant, with 
higher R&D productivity tending to improve the relative performance of all policies, particularly 
the R&D subsidy, relative to the emissions price. The reverse is true for the case of lower R&D 
productivity. 
We also evaluate the effect on relative policy costs of the degree of knowledge 
appropriability through two additional scenarios: (1) relatively low appropriability (ρ = 0.25), 
and (2) perfect appropriability (ρ = 1.0). Because a lower degree of appropriability implies larger 
knowledge spillovers, the relative performance of any policy that directly or indirectly invests 
more in knowledge than the emissions price will improve as spillovers increase. Thus, with low 
appropriability, the costs of all the policies decrease relative to the emissions price, albeit 
modestly, with the R&D subsidy experiencing the largest improvement, due to its direct effect on 
knowledge investment. The scenario with complete appropriability eliminates the knowledge 
externality entirely, thereby worsening relative performance, particularly of the R&D subsidy.27  
                                                 
27 Although the model assumes that the appropriation rate for knowledge generated through R&D and learning is 
the same, the sensitivity analyses shed some light on the potential effect of relaxing this assumption.  For example, if 
one expects learning to be more firm specific and, as a result, less likely to spill over, policies subsidizing 
renewables are less appropriate for compensating for the knowledge externality. They would therefore perform 
worse relative to the other policies.  If, on the other hand, one expected learning to be more difficult to patent and 
appropriate the related rents, then renewable subsidy policies would be relatively more justified to internalize the 
knowledge externality. 
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In our next sensitivity analysis, we explore the effect of changing the length of time in the 
second stage. Shortening the number of years in the second stage from 20 to 10 lowers the 
weight on the second period. This worsens the performance of all policies relative to the 
emissions price, because there is less time in the future to benefit from the application of 
technological change, which is relied on more heavily in the other policies. Alternatively, 
increasing the weight on the second period (by quadrupling the number of years to 80) has the 
opposite effect of improving the performance of the other policies relative to the emissions price. 
In both of these sensitivity cases, however, the qualitative story remains the same and the other 
policies continue to be at least 35% more expensive than the emissions price in achieving CO2 
reductions.  
The final sensitivity analysis examines a flat natural gas electricity supply function and 
illustrates the importance of the emissions intensity of the marginal fossil technology in 
determining the cost of renewable policies, which reduce emissions by crowding out marginal 
fossil generation. With a flat natural gas electricity supply function, additional renewable 
generation displaces only natural gas-fired generation, not the more emissions intensive coal-
fired generation, making it more difficult to achieve emissions reductions. 
4.5.  Combination policies for addressing technology spillovers 
The presence of knowledge spillovers in our model implies that separate policy 
instruments are necessary to optimally correct the climate externality and the externalities 
associated with both learning and R&D. In this section, we explore several scenarios with 
different policy combinations to assess empirically the theoretical findings of section 2.6, while 
maintaining all assumptions at their values in our central case.  
We first assess a scenario with a portfolio of all three policies, with the learning and 
R&D subsidies set at their optimal levels and the emissions price set at a level so that the 
portfolio achieves the same emissions target as does a $7/ton CO2 price alone (i.e., 4.8% 
reduction). The optimal R&D subsidy of 50% is straightforward to compute from equation (30) 
(1 0 . 5 σ ρ =− = ) based on the assumed appropriability rate. The optimal first-period “learning 
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subsidy” for renewables (s1) depends on the future level of renewables use and other variables; it 
must therefore be solved numerically using equation (31) along with the other equations of the 
system. We find that the optimal learning subsidy is 0.3 cents/kWh, or 4% of the electricity 
price. While this amount of subsidy for learning may appear small, it is similar to the optimal 
R&D subsidy if both are expressed as a percentage of revenue. That is, the optimal R&D subsidy 
of 50% has a corresponding R&D level that is 12% of renewable revenue, so that the R&D 
subsidy is 6% of revenue. Nonetheless, this level of learning subsidy is much lower than the 
levels typically seen in practice, suggesting that for relatively mature renewables in particular 
(e.g., wind), it is difficult to rationalize large subsidies on the basis of learning. 
As a result of greater cost reductions and renewables penetration with the R&D and 
learning subsidies, the emissions price necessary to achieve a 4.8% emissions reduction falls by 
36% to $4.5/ton CO2 (from $7.0/ton CO2). Importantly, the associated cost of the policy 
combination becomes negative and has a slight annual surplus of $0.04 billion. By applying the 
50% R&D subsidy and 0.3 cents/kWh learning subsidy one at a time, one can see that the net 
surplus of the combination policy is due primarily to the R&D subsidy ($0.20 billion surplus 
annually) offsetting the cost of the emissions price, rather than the learning subsidy ($0.02 billion 
surplus annually). However, the optimal R&D and learning subsidies lead to emissions 
reductions of only 1.4% and 0.3%, respectively. These results demonstrate that the cost of 
emissions reductions through a combination of policies could be considerably lower than policies 
targeted solely at technology R&D or emissions pricing. Nonetheless, the emissions reductions 
associated with this policy package are due primarily to the emissions price. 
Finally, we explore the potential of the emissions price to act as a second-best policy response to 
the knowledge externality through a scenario in which we found the level of the emissions price 
that minimized non-environmental costs. In our central scenario, the emissions price is the most 
cost-effective policy for attaining the given reduction target. The level of the chosen emissions 
target does, however, affect the relative importance of the environmental and knowledge 
externalities in determining the efficiency of different instruments.  To explore this, we briefly 
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examine the possibility of “win–win” emissions policies that in effect have zero or even negative 
costs due to their role in indirectly correcting the knowledge externality inherent in imperfect 
appropriability in our model. There is therefore a range of stringency of each of these policies 
that will lead to positive net benefits (i.e., negative costs), not counting environmental benefits. 
Under our modeling assumptions, these stringency levels are clearly less than those we explored 
above, which all have positive costs (not counting environmental benefits). We found that the 
optimal emissions price as a second-best means of correcting the knowledge externality was 
$1.30/ton CO2 in our model, leading to a 0.9% emissions reduction and an associated positive 
annualized economic surplus of $0.014 billion (not including environmental benefits). We also 
found positive surplus associated with all the other policies set at a level to achieve the same 
0.9% emissions reduction—in fact, surplus higher than that of the emissions price. For example, 
the 38% R&D subsidy necessary to achieve a 0.9% reduction has positive surplus of 12.3 times 
the emissions price, illustrating the salience of correcting R&D market failures as a “no regrets” 
climate policy. However, this dominance of R&D subsidies and other policies over the emissions 
price is limited to very low levels of targeted emissions reduction. 
5.  Conclusion 
We assess different policy options for reducing CO2 emissions and promoting renewable 
energy and evaluate their performance with respect to economic surplus, emissions reduction, 
renewable energy production, and R&D.  We find that for anything beyond very small emissions 
reduction targets, the emissions price is the most efficient single policy for reducing emissions, 
since it simultaneously gives incentives for fossil energy producers to reduce emissions intensity, 
for consumers to conserve, and for renewable energy producers to expand production and to 
invest in knowledge to reduce their costs.  The other policies can be described as offering 
different combinations of these incentives, which have different consequences for the 
distribution and the overall size of the burden of meeting an emissions reduction target. 
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A renewable energy portfolio standard creates an implicit tax on fossil energy in the form 
of the mandate to buy green certificates, which then fund a subsidy to renewable energy through 
the certificate value.  The combination raises the total price received by the renewable energy 
sector and encourages more renewable energy output and R&D than a tradable emissions 
performance standard or a fossil output tax, but at a greater cost to surplus.  The performance 
standard, on the other hand, also provides fossil-fueled producers with the incentive to reduce 
their emissions intensity, which reduces the burden placed on the other margins of emissions 
reduction.  However, the performance standard establishes an implicit fossil output subsidy, 
which keeps electricity prices low and reduces conservation incentives. 
The fossil output tax promotes conservation and renewables output at the expense of 
consumer surplus, although it also raises revenues.  The renewables production subsidy supports 
green generation at taxpayer expense, and achieving emissions reductions is costlier with no 
disincentive for fossil fuels.  The renewable energy research subsidy is the most expensive way 
to achieve emissions reductions since the main driver of renewables production and R&D 
investment—higher prices for renewable energy—is absent, as is any incentive to reduce 
consumption or the emissions intensity of fossil fuels.   
The underlying process of technological change, be it through learning by doing or R&D, 
turns out to be far less important than the incentives to use technology efficiently to reduce 
emissions. This case is reinforced where technology policies are directed at a small share of 
overall current electricity production, as are renewables. It simply becomes expensive to try to 
reduce overall emissions by pushing on a small piece of the electricity portfolio and without any 
direct incentive for reducing emissions intensity or overall energy use. Nonetheless, the nature of 
technological change and the degree of knowledge spillovers do have discernable effects on the 
relative cost of alternative policies, which have differential effects on knowledge investment and 
how it occurs.  
Finally, we find that an optimal portfolio of policies will include an emissions price and 
subsidies for technology R&D and learning. In our empirical application, we find that a policy 
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portfolio of this type can reduce emissions at significantly lower cost than any single policy 
alone, although the emissions reductions continue to be attributable to primarily the emissions 
price. Nonetheless, it seems likely that R&D focused on breakthrough technologies could have 
greater salience in the context of deeper long-term emissions reductions, although this lies 
beyond the scope of the current paper. 
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Appendix 
An important issue in modeling technological change is the extent to which firms expect 
to appropriate the returns to their investments in building knowledge.  In the main body of the 
paper, ρ  represents this appropriable share for our representative firm, and we derive this 
parameter here from a notional model of N identical firms. This extends the model from Fischer 
et al. (2003) to N firms, similar to Spence (1984) but allowing for an influence of appropriability 
and spillovers on private R&D incentives through licensing. In contrast to Spence’s (1984) 
model, in our model, knowledge is completely disseminated in the symmetric equilibrium, 
although spillovers limit the ability of innovators to appropriate all of the associated rents 
through royalty payments. As a result, every firm has the same cumulative investment and 














=+ ∑ .   
For an individual firm i, profits are 
( ) () 1 1 11 11 1 2 2 22 22 1 1 ( ) ( , ) (1 ) (( ) ( , ) ( , ))
R
ii i i i i i i i i nPs qG K q R h nPs q G K q Y h q πσ δ =+ − − − + +− + i i
)
, (35) 
where   are royalties received from other firms, net of those paid out.  In other words, 
, where each royalty price   represents the 
appropriable cost savings from firm j due to innovation by firm i:   
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where  ˆ ρ  is the share of the innovation that cannot be imitated. In other words, the equilibrium 
royalty equals the cost savings to firm j from enjoying access to the remainder of h1i that cannot 
be imitated.  
Under these conditions, the maximum other firms will pay to license the innovation is the 
difference in costs between imitating the research (or learning), which has effectiveness  ˆ 1 ρ − , 
and costs with full access.  (Note that since profits are maximized with respect to output in the 
second period, small changes in that variable do not affect marginal profits or marginal 
royalties.)  Consequently, in a symmetric equilibrium with full cross-licensing, 
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and from the individual firm’s first-order conditions for learning and research,  we get  
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In aggregate, royalty payments are transfers among firms, so  11 (,)0 ii iYh q = ∑ .  
Furthermore,   and  (,) (,) i i GKq G Kq =∑ i i qN q = , implying that  / j GKN G K / ∂ ∂=∂ ∂.  While 
knowledge is common across firms, research expenditures are individual, so we have 
() 11 () () ii ii 1 i R hR h R h =≡ ∑∑ , implying  1, 1 () ( ) hi h Rh R h i = . 
Summing (38) and (39) over all firms and dividing by N, we have the following 
aggregate first-order conditions for learning and research: 
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where  .  Due to imperfect appropriation, these results deviate from what 
would occur from maximizing the aggregate profit function (5) with respect to aggregate output 
and R&D investment in the first period (q1 and h1). 
( ˆ 1(1 ) / N ρρ =+ − ) N
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intensity of fossil fuels  Yes  Yes No No  No No 
Energy conservation (via 
electricity price increase)  Yes  It depends  Yes  It depends  No  No 
Subsidy for renewable 
energy output  No  Yes (implicit)  No  Yes (implicit)  Yes  No 
Subsidy  for  R&D  No  No No No  No Yes 
 
Table 2. Parameter values and other assumptions 
Parameter Base  Value 
Baseline price of electricity 0.073  $/kWh
 
Intercept of coal-based electricity supply (cy1) 0.023  $/kWh 
Slope of coal-based electricity supply (cy2)  2.2 x 10
-14 $/kWh
2 
Intercept of natural gas electricity supply (cx1) 0.061  $/kWh 
Slope of natural gas electricity supply (cx2)  1.8 x 10
-14 $/kWh
2 
Intercept of renewables electricity supply (g1) 0.059  $/kWh 
Slope of renewables electricity supply (g2)  1.2 x 10
-13 $/kWh
2 
CO2 intensity of coal-based electricity (µx) 0.96
 kg CO2/kWh 
CO2 intensity of natural gas-based electricity (µy) 0.42
 kg CO2/kWh 
Electricity demand elasticity (ε) –0.20 
Learning parameter (k1) 0.15 
R&D parameter (k2) 0.15 
R&D investment cost parameter (γ0)  3.9 x 10
9 
R&D investment cost parameter (γ1) 1.2 
Degree of appropriability (ρ) 0.50 
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Table 3. Baseline results without policy 
 1
st stage  2
nd stage 
Price of electricity ($/kWh)  0.073
  0.072 
Electricity demand (kWh/yr)  4.20 x 10
12  4.20 x 10
12 
Coal generation (kWh/yr)  2.29 x 10
12  2.27 x 10
12 
Natural gas generation (kWh/yr)  0.67 x 10
12  0.64 x 10
12 
Renewables generation (kWh/yr)  0.14 x 10
12  0.20 x 10
12 
Nuclear and hydro generation (kWh/yr)  1.10 x 10
12  1.10 x 10
12 
Renewables share of generation   3.3%  4.8% 
CO2 emissions (billion metric tons CO2/yr) 2.48  2.44 
Rate of renewables cost reduction  12%  — 
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Renewable R&D increase  75% 118%  139%  255%  277% 4043% 
Additional renewables cost 
reduction  4% 5%  6%  10%  11%  25% 
∆Consumer surplus ($B/yr)  –15.5 6.2  –27.6  2.1  6.4  5.0 
∆Producer surplus ($B/yr)  –1.1 –6.5  4.4  –2.6  –2.2  –2.5 
∆Transfers ($B/yr)  16.4 0.0  22.8  0.0  –4.8  –5.5 
∆Surplus (excluding 
environ. benefits) ($B/yr)  –0.24 –0.33  –0.38  –0.48  –0.58  –2.9 
∆Surplus relative to 
emissions price  1.00 1.41  1.61  2.04  2.47  12.49 
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Table 5. Explicit and implicit taxes and subsidies of alternative policies 
Explicit and implicit taxes and subsidies   
Policy  Emissions 
price 
($/tCO2) 









Fixed-price policies        
Emissions price  7.0  —  —  7.7 
Output tax on fossil generation  —  0.8  —  8.0 
Renewables production subsidy  —  —  1.4  8.6 
Rate-based policies        
Emissions performance standard  9.5  -0.7  0.7  7.9 
Renewables portfolio standard  —  0.1  1.2  8.5 
 
 
Table 6. Sensitivity analyses 



















Central scenario  1.00 1.41  1.61 2.04 2.47  12.49 
More elastic demand 
(ε=-0.5)  1.00 2.05  1.49 2.60 4.12  31.63 
Inelastic demand 
(ε=0.0)  1.00 1.00  1.55 1.55 1.55  5.45 
No learning/higher R&D 
(k1=0.0; k2=0.19)  1.00 1.44  1.68 2.26 2.78  4.27 
High learning/lower R&D 
(k1=0.2; k2=0.13)  1.00 1.40  1.59 1.99 2.41  18.78 
High R&D productivity/ 
baseline learning 
(k1=0.15; k2=0.20) 
1.00 1.27  1.43 1.27 1.73  4.52 
Low R&D productivity/ 
baseline learning 
(k1=0.15; k2=0.10) 
1.00 1.50  1.74 2.61 3.09  44.46 
Low appropriability 
(ρ=0.25)  1.00 1.41  1.61 1.93 2.34  3.49 
High appropriability 
(ρ=1.0)  1.00 1.44  1.66 2.44 2.79  18.62 
Shorter second stage 
(T=10, n2=6.1)  1.00 1.47  1.70 2.40 2.86  19.07 
Longer second stage 
(T=80, n2=10.0)  1.00 1.35  1.53 1.71 2.12  7.95 
Flat natural gas electricity 
supply (cc2=0)  1.00 1.50  3.32 4.17 4.83  37.02 
 
52 